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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ANTITRUST: Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC'
Former Attorney General John Mitchell stated in 1969 that
the "Department of Justice [might] very well oppose any merger
among the top 200 manufacturing firms or firms of comparable
size in other industries."2 He added that the Department would
1. 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), petition for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3332 (U.S. Dec.
12, 1972) (No. 637).
2. Address by Attorney General Mitchell, June 6, 1969, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 50,107
at 55,128.
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also continue to challenge mergers which may substantially
lessen potential competition. This statement may mean that the
government will no longer look to a lessening of competition as
the primary rationale for challenging corporate acquisitions; size
alone may now be sufficient to find antitrust violations without
clear proof that competition will in fact be substantially lessened.
The recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC may be an
important step in the implementation of the policy suggested by
former Attorney General Mitchell.
On March 29, 1968, the Kennecott Copper Corporation
consummated the acquisition of the Peabody Coal Company.
Kennecott, the nation's leading copper producer,3 was seeking to
diversify into a "business with growth potential and without the
cyclical nature of earnings from the copper business."4 A decision
was made in the early 1960's to diversify into an industry that
would yield an immediate return on an investment. Several in-
dustries were considered by Kennecott as potential areas of in-
vestment.
In the period between 1963 and 1965 Kennecott had investi-
gated the possibility of acquiring a "going" oil concern. Oil was
earning a higher rate of return than any other industry being
considered by the company.5 Meetings had been conducted with
several established oil companies including Skelly Oil and Sun-
ray DX; however, those companies were not interested in a
merger. Kennecott determined that entry on a "grass roots basis"
was not advisable and finally rejected this avenue of expansion
in the fall of 1965.
Kennecott then decided to acquire a coal company and on
July 21, 1965, title to all of the reserves of the Knight-Ideal Coal
Company, in Carbon County, Utah, was transferred to Kennecott
in culmination of a series of purchase options dating from October
1964. The coal reserves of Knight-Ideal were very limited' and
Kennecott purchased these reserves to "provide a hedge against
rising natural gas costs."7 This acquisition later proved to be most
3. Kennecott had sales of $739 million in 1966, approximately thirty percent of the
domestic production of copper. Kennecott was the 55th largest firm in the United States
in terms of assets and 111th in sales in 1966. Kennecott Copper Corp., 3 TRADE REG.
REP. 19,619 at 21,663 (F.T.C. 1971).
4. Initial Decision, Kennecott Copper Corp., No. 8765 at 85 (F.T.C. 1970).
5. Id. at 86.
6. Knight-Ideal held coal reserves of 34.1 million tons as compared to 5.5 billion held
by Peabody, the nation's leading coal producer. Id. at 9, 114.
7. 467 F.2d at 72.
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troublesome to Kennecott in refuting the allegation that it was
seeking to enter the coal market other than by the acquisition of
Peabody.
At the time of the Knight-Ideal acquisition Kennecott's
management began to give serious consideration to the produc-
tion and sale of coal. The possibility of entering the coal industry
was studied in the same manner as the oil industry had been
explored in prior years. Peabody, the nation's leading coal produ-
cer,8 was approached and negotiations led to a merger on March
29, 1968.
Four months after the acquisition was consummated the
Federal Trade Commission' issued a complaint against Kenne-
cott, charging that the merger with Peabody violated section 7 of
the Clayton Act.' ° The FTC alleged that the effect of the acquisi-
tion "[might] be to lessen competition substantially or tend to
create a monopoly"" in the production and sale of coal.
On March 9, 1970, a Hearing Examiner dismissed the com-
plaint, finding that, although Kennecott "was a potential entrant
into the production and sale of coal," the Company did not "con-
stitute a substantial factor in that line of commerce."' 2 The deci-
sion was based on a finding that the coal industry was not marked
by a high degree of concentration and that there were other quali-
fied potential entrants. Concluding that there was no proof that
Kennecott would have entered the coal industry other than by
means of the Peabody acquisition, the Hearing Examiner stated
that the FTC had not adequately shown that the effect of the
"elimination of Kennecott as a potential entrant or otherwise, has
been or may be to substantially lessen competition."'"
8. Peabody produced approximately ten percent of the total domestic production in
1966, making it the largest producer in the nation. Peabody ranks 186th in assets and
317th in sales in the country. Initial Decision, Kennecott Copper Corp., No. 8765, at 8
(F.T.C. 1970).
9. Hereinafter referred to as the "FTC."
10. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970) provides:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
11. Initial Decision, Federal Trade Commission, No. 8765 (F.T.C. 1970).
12. This conclusion was based on the fact that the Examiner found numerous other
potential entrants into the coal industry such that the removal of Kennecott from the edge
of the market would not substantially lessen competition. Id. at 228.
13. Id. at 229.
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The Federal Trade Commission reversed the Hearing Exam-
iner's decision.' 4 Finding the merger violative of section 7, the
FTC ordered divestiture of Peabody within six months. In con-
trast to the findings of the Hearing Examiner, the FTC found not
only that the record left "little doubt that Kennecott was a sub-
stantial potential entrant into the coal industry" but that it "was
an actual competitor."' 5 In a well-reasoned opinion the FTC con-
cluded that the acquisition substantially lessened competition
because "not only [was] new competition not added, but a sig-
nificant competitive influence [was] eliminated which was ex-
erted by the potential entrant while remaining at the edge of the
market."' 6 The FTC's finding was based on the well-established
rule that the removal of such a pro-competitive force is within the
scope of section 7."1 More specifically, the Commission relied on
the"toe-hold" theory,'" citing the acquisition of the Knight-Ideal
reserves as a toe-hold acquisition. It was the FTC's view that
Kennecott could have entered the coal industry by way of acquisi-
tion of a small company rather than an industry leader.'"
The decision of the FTC was affirmed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 2° The rationale used by
the Tenth Circuit, however, was less convincing than that of the
FTC. The Tenth Circuit decision made no mention of the toe-
hold principle. While the opinion is not entirely clear, the court
seemingly relied on the potential entrant theory but held that it
was proper for the FTC to find anti-competitive effect from the
14. Kennecott Copper Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,619 (F.T.C. 1971).
15. The Commission based their conclusion on the finding that Kennecott's interest
in the sale of coal commercially had existed since 1963 and that the purchase of Knight-
Ideal was merely one step toward the development of a large scale competitor. Id. at
21,665.
16. Id. at 21,670.
17. Several previous cases have found section 7 violations based on the removal of
a potential competitor. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. FTC, 386 U.S. 568 (1967); FTC
v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical
Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
18. The FTC found that Kennecott could have entered the coal market by acquiring
a small company rather than one of the leading firms. The Knight-Ideal acquisition would
provide a ready basis for applying this "toe-hold" theory. A toe-hold acquisition is "the
purchase of a small company capable of expansion into a substantial competitive
force-may be as economically desirable and beneficial as internal expansion into a rele-
vant market .... " Such new entry "is to be encouraged . . . and . . . a merger with a
leading firm, especially in a concentrated industry, which eliminates the likelihood of such
desirable entry through a toe-hold acquisition is embraced within the prohibitions of the
statute." Bendix Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,288 (F.T.C. 1970).
19. 3 TRADE REG. REP. at 21,669.
20. 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972).
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"deep pocket" of funds possessed by Kennecott prior to the
merger.' This theory had not been previously applied in an area
other than that of product extension acquisitions. The decision
therefore placed major emphasis on the "combined financial...
resources of the merging companies . . . resulting . . . in a
merged company with a real potential to accelerate the already
remarkable trend toward oligopoly."2 This note will examine the
Tenth Circuit's decision and its potential impact on future corpo-
rate mergers.
THE STATUTE
The Celler-Kefauver Act of 19503 amended section 7 of the
Clayton Act in order to expand the scope of its coverage, which
had previously been limited to horizontal mergers-the acquisi-
tion by one corporation of a competitor in the same market. 4 The
original version of section 7 gave the government the power to
prohibit the acquisition of an interest in another corporation only
"where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially
lessen competition between the corporation . . . so acquired and
the corporation making the acquisition .... ,,21 The language in
the original statute was thus limited to horizontal mergers. Verti-
cal mergers, or mergers of firms in a supplier and customer rela-
tionship, were not covered by the original statute, although prior
to 1950 vertical mergers had not totally escaped government regu-
lation.2 6 Likewise, conglomerate mergers, that is, mergers be-
21. 467 F.2d at 78.
22. Id. at 79.
23. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125.
24. The relevant market is generally defined to encompass the area of effective
competition as determined by reference to a product market (the line of commerce), and
a geographic market (the section of the country). Determination of the relevant lines of
competition is called "market definition." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
324 (1962).
25. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730. The original section 7 stated:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation engaged
also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially
lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the
corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or
commodity, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.
26. Prior to 1950 vertical arrangements such as exclusive dealing contracts, tying
arrangements and requirements contracts were covered by section 3 of the Clayton Act.
E.g., Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). Further, vertical
arrangements had been prosecuted under the Sherman Act. E.g. United States v. Yellow
Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill. 1946), aff'd, 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
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tween companies that neither compete directly nor stand in a
buyer-seller relationship, were not within the scope of the original
text of section 7. However, unlike vertical acquisitions, conglom-
erate mergers did not come within the provisions of any other
antitrust statute. Case law regarding conglomerate acquisitions
was virtually non-existent prior to 1950.27
The stated purpose of the 1950 amendment was to slow the
trend "toward an increase of monopolistic mergers" tending to-
ward the "concentration of businesses in the hands of a few per-
sons. ' 28 The broad language of the amended section 7 was seem-
ingly intended to bring both vertical and conglomerate mergers
within the coverage of the Clayton Act. Early cases under the
amended statute, however, dealt primarily with horizontal and
vertical mergers. 29 The purely conglomerate merger, or one in
which "there are no discernible economic relationships between
the businesses of the acquiring and acquired firm, '30 was not
susceptible to established standards used to measure anti-
competitive effect. Obviously there could be no substantial less-
ening of actual competition between two such firms because by
definition they were in no way economically related. "Potential
competition" has become the standard for determining the anti-
competitive effects of proposed conglomerate mergers under sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act.
Potential competition, which is the threat of entry from out-
side the market induced by high profits and increaed demand,
has been recognized by economists as a competitive factor since
the eighteenth century. 3' It is an accepted economic principle that
the existence of a potential competitor, waiting on the edge of a
market, "will tend to cause existing sellers to charge a lower price
than they otherwise would .... ,,32 Existing sellers are also forced
to keep production costs down and expand with the market in an
effort to deny the potential entrant a foothold.3 3 The removal of
such a competitive force through merger with an existing compet-
27. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L.
REV. 1313, 1315 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Turner].
28. 96 CONG. REc. 16503 (1950) (remarks of Senator Kefauver).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964);
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962).
30. Turner, supra note 27, at 1315.
31. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONs 60 (1776).
32. Turner, supra note 27, at 1364.
33. Id. at 1365.
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itor will tend to substantially lessen competition within the
meaning of section 7.34
POTENTIAL COMPETITION
United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co.35 was one of the
first cases to utilize the concept of potential competition in the
merger area. Penn-Olin, a combination of Pennsalt Chemical
Corporation and Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, was a
joint venture formed to produce sodium chlorate in the southeast-
ern United States. Olin had never produced the product prior to
the venture but was familiar with a product line involving similar
techniques of manufacture. Pennsalt was one of the nation's lead-
ing sodium chlorate producers. The government argued that the
entry of Penn-Olin into the Southeastern market substantially
lessened competition because Pennsalt and Olin were foreclosed
from entering the market individually. In short, potential compe-
tition between the two firms had been made impossible. The
lower court had refused to break up the joint venture because
there was no affirmative evidence that both firms would have
entered the market independently.
The Supreme Court stated first that the definition of poten-
tial competition was the "reasonable probability that the acquir-
ing corporation would have entered the field by internal expan-
sion but for the merger." 3 However, in Penn-Olin there was no
clear evidence that either firm would have entered by any means
other than the joint venture. The Court turned to the facts sur-
rounding the merger and distilled a series of factors indicating an
intent to enter the market independently.3 7 The Court considered
the following factors: first, both Pennsalt and Olin had been long
identified with the industry. It was a natural avenue of expan-
sion. Second, both companies had evidenced a strong interest in
entering the relevant market area. It was noted that both compa-
nies had done market studies concerning the advisability of inde-
pendent entry. Third, both companies had a good reputation and
business connections with the major consumers in the Southeast.
Fourth, each had the know-how and capacity to enter the market
with compelling reasons for entering. Finally, the Southeastern
34. Turner, supra note 27, at 1362.
35. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
36. Id. at 175.
37. Id. at 175.
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market was expanding rapidly and a large scale consumption of
sodium chlorate was projected.
Although it could not be proven positively that either joint
venturer would independently enter the market, the Court felt
that the "array of probability . . . [reached] the prima facie
stage."3 From this, the Court stated, it could be inferred that
both Pennsalt and Olin were potential entrants, and held that a
"finding should have been made as to the reasonable probability
that either one of the corporations would have entered the market
• . . while the other would have remained a significant potential
competitor. '3 The case was remanded for a determination as to
whether either company would have entered through internal
expansion.4 ° It was noted that the district court "should remem-
ber that the mandate of Congress is in terms of the probability
of a lessening of substantial competition, not in terms of tangible
present restraint."'
In 1967 the Supreme Court, in FTC v. Procter & Gamble,4"
decided what is considered to be its major case dealing with the
potential entry concept. Procter & Gamble, the producer of a line
of high-turnover household products, purchased the Clorox
Chemical Company, a manufacturer of liquid bleach. The liquid
bleach market was highly concentrated with the top six firms
controlling eighty percent of the sales volume. Clorox was the
largest single producer with over forty-eight percent. The acquisi-
tion was challenged on the ground that the removal of Procter as
a potential entrant would tend to lessen competition in such a
highly oligopolistic market. The lower court dismissed the case on
the ground that it was not proven that Procter would have en-
tered except through the merger.
The Supreme Court labeled the acquisition a "product ex-
tension merger" because the products were complementary, pro-
duced with similar facilities and marketed through the same
channels. 3 The Court noted that such mergers had two anticom-
38. Id. at 175.
39. Id. at 175-6.
40. On remand the action was dismissed for failure to prove that either of the parties
would have entered the market independently. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical
Co., 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 389 U.S. 308
(1967).
41. 378 U.S. at 177.
42. 386 U.S. 568 (1967). [Hereinafter referred to as "Clorox"].
43. Id. at 577. Turner notes that the product extension merger is the most logical
type of conglomerate acquisition. A company seeking to expand will "tend to buy into
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petitive effects. First, substitution of the powerful acquiring firm
for the smaller but already dominant firm substantially reduced
the competitive structure of the industry by raising entry barriers
and by dissuading the smaller firms from aggressively competing.
Second, the acquisition eliminated the potential competitive in-
fluence of the acquiring firm."
The Court's first reason concerned the great disparity in size
between Procter and competitors in the liquid bleach market.
The Court stated that entry by a new company into the market
would be discouraged because a struggling new entrant would not
be able to compete effectively. Any producer of Procter's size
which was capable of giving volume purchase discounts and
which enjoyed the lower costs of large production had a distinct
market advantage.
The Court's primary concern, however, was product advertis-
ing. Liquid bleach sales are based almost solely on generating
consumer familiarity because the various brands are virtually
identical. Procter was one of the largest national advertisers and
the advantages in the promotion of Clorox, when coupled with
other factors, were enough to jeopardize effective competition.
In response to the argument that Procter was a potential
entrant, the Court listed several criteria in support of its conclu-
sion that Procter violated section 7.45 First, Procter had a history
of diversification into "product lines related to its basic
detergent-soap cleanser business."" Procter had studied the ad-
visability of entering the market independently and the company
recognized liquid bleach as a natural avenue of expansion. Sec-
ondly, Procter had experience in producing and marketing re-
lated products. It had all the facilities necessary to enter by inter-
nal expansion and possessed a nationally developed marketing
system which would facilitate independent entry. Thirdly, Proc-
ter was in fact the most likely prospect for entry into a market in
which the number of potential entrants was not so large as to be
able to withstand the elimination of one potential entrant. The
Court regarded these elements as demonstrative of the fact that
Procter was the most likely entrant into the liquid bleach market
and therefore divestiture was ordered. There was no conclusive
those fields with which they have at least some degree of familiarity, and where economics
and efficiencies from assimilation are at least possible." Turner, supra note 27, at 1315.
44. 386 U.S. at 578.
45. Id. at 580-81.
46. Id. at 573.
[VOL. XXXIII
KENNECOrr COPPER CORP. V. FTC
evidence of actual intent to enter, but as in Penn-Olin the Court
was dealing with "reasonable probability" and not "tangible
present restraint."
Any question as to the general applicability of the Clorox
decision was removed by General Foods Corporation v. Federal
Trade Commission,47 which involved a fact situation almost
identical to Clorox. General Foods purchased the largest com-
pany in a highly oligopolistic market, which acquisition the Court
considered a "mixed conglomerate merger."48 The Court applied
the same standards as in Clorox to determine whether General
Foods' acquisition of SOS would in fact lessen competition.
It was not proven that General Foods was in any sense a
potential entrant, but the Court held that under the authority of
the Clorox case it was not essential to have a potential entrant
anxiously awaiting entry into the market.0 It was sufficient that
the factors noted above indicated that the merger would cause a
substantial lessening of competition.
A more recent federal court case, United States v. Wilson
Sporting Goods Co.,"' indicates a further development of the
same criteria as those used in the Clorox and SOS cases for deter-
mining the strength of potential competition. Wilson acquired
the Nissen Corporation, a manufacturer of gymnastic equipment,
and the leading producer in a highly concentrated market.12 The
court considered the transaction to be a product extension merger
because the product lines of the two firms were so closely related.
The facts in Wilson were therefore very similar to those in the
Clorox case.
As in Clorox, the court attacked the merger on two levels:
47. 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968). [Hereinafter
referred to as "SOS"].
48. Turner, supra note 27, at 1315. Turner identifies a mixed conglomerate merger
as the "acquisition of a company manufacturing a different product related to a product
or products of the acquiring firm, because it can be produced with much the same facilities
• . .[or] .. .sold through the same distribution channels .. ."Id.
49. The Court listed several factors in support of its conclusion. First, the market
strength of the acquired company (SOS held fifty-two percent of the market); second, the
disparate size of the acquiring firm with regard to the competitors in the acquired firms
market; and finally the advertising and marketing advantages to be derived from General
Foods existing market power. 386 F.2d 936 at 944-45. See notes 44-45 supra and accompa-
nying text.
50. 386 F.2d at 946.
51. 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
52. Nissen accounted for thirty-two percent of a market in which the four largest




Wilson's size as compared to other competitors in the acquired
firm's market and Wilson's status as a potential entrant. Despite
Wilson's disproportionately large size the court noted that there
would be no violation of section 7 unless competition would in
fact be lessened by the merger,53 stating that the test is "competi-
tion, not competitors: therefore, the mere fact that it is an indus-
try of large diversified firms means nothing as long as competition
in the relevant market remains."54 The one factor which indicated
that competition might be constrained by the merger was Wil-
son's nationally developed marketing system. Advantages on the
dealer level such as volume discounts and the desirability of buy-
ing through one reputable firm, could not be discounted as being
without detrimental effects.
There was no clear proof that Wilson would have entered
independently, but the court suggested several factors which in-
dicated that the company was the most likely potential entrant.55
The court concluded that Wilson appeared to be the most likely
potential entrant and was so regarded by the existing competitors
in the market.5" If not for the merger they would have remained
on the edge of the market as a likely entrant constantly affecting
competition. To allow the merger, the court stated, would "tend
to decrease existing competition by eliminating as potential com-
petitors the . . . firms on the edge of the market. . . .. The key
factor, however, was the court's fear that the acquisition would
cause a series of mergers involving the gymnastic equipment mar-
ket.58 It noted that the "likelihood that a given merger will trigger
other mergers and give impetus to further concentration is a rele-
vant factor in assessing the anti-competitive effect of that
merger."59 The merger was dissolved, the court concluding that
53. 288 F. Supp. at 554.
54. Id. at 558.
55. The evidence demonstrated that Wilson was a strong competitor in a related
product line, that Wilson had a sound business reputation and dealt with many of the
same customers as Nissen; that Wilson admitted to being physically capable of entry; and
that the market for gymnastic equipment was growing rapidly and provided excellent
opportunities for expanded sales. 288 F. Supp. at 561.
56. Turner enumerates several minimum conditions necessary to prohibit an acquis-
ition. The second factor is that the merging firm must be regarded by those in the market
"as the most likely entrant or one of a very few likely entrants." Turner, supra note 27,
at 1363. The Wilson Court found this to be the case and relied upon that fact in finding
the merger anti-competitive in nature. 288 F. Supp. at 561,
57. 288 F. Supp. at 558.
58. All of the major sporting goods dealers had tried to buy into the gymnastic
equipment market. Id. at 558.
59. Id. at 559, quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343-44 (1962).
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Wilson would have to enter the market through internal expan-
sion.
The Wilson case is unique in that it disregards one of the
essential criteria used in prior cases for determining potential
competition. It has been noted that the removal of one of a num-
ber of potential entrants has little or no competitive effect on the
relevant market."0 The court in Wilson found that every major
sporting goods dealer had attempted to enter the gymnastic
equipment market through mergers and that under accepted po-
tential competition theory the entry of Wilson would not tend to
substantially lessen competition caused by potential entrants on
the edge of the market. The court chose instead to rely on other
factors6' in concluding that it would be better if Wilson entered
by internal expansion.
The Wilson decision lacks an analysis of the actual effect of
the acquisition on competition within the market. The court
seemed to consider what it thought was best for competition
rather than to analyze whether the merger was actually violative
of section 7.
The Kennecott decision is the most recent step in this line
of conglomerate merger cases; however, it seems to go beyond the
decisions in prior cases by using new standards for determining
whether a merger is violative of section 7. Earlier section 7 cases
had established numerous criteria to be used in determining the
anti-competitive effect of a merger, and several of these standards
were utilized by the Tenth Circuit in finding that Kennecott's
acquisition of Peabody did in fact lessen competition. In particu-
lar, the court relied on the tendency toward concentration in the
coal industry, a finding that Kennecott was the only likely en-
trant into the coal market and the disparity in size between Ken-
necott and existing coal companies.
TENDING TOWARD CONCENTRATION
Turner has suggested that one condition a court must find
to exist prior to finding a merger violative of section 7 is that the
market involved must be oligopolistic. "[T]he number of actual
sellers must be sufficiently small . . .to maintain prices above
60. Turner, supra note 27, at 1365.
61. See notes 53-59 supra and accompanying text.
1973]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
competitive levels."62 Prior conglomerate merger cases had given
a great deal of weight to the degree of concentration in the rele-
vant market."3 The Penn-Olin Court, for example, defined a po-
tential entrant as one "waiting anxiously to enter an oligopolistic
market."64 However, by prior standards the coal industry was not
highly concentrated. 5 The court noted that it was not presently
an oligopolistic market but that it was "an industry on its way
to becoming highly concentrated," and as such the FTC was jus-
tified in acting "so as to prevent the development of a tightly
concentrated industry."6
Reliance upon a "tendency toward concentration" standard
rather than an "existing oligopolistic" standard seems justified
under established antitrust doctrine. One of the purposes of the
Celler-Kefauver Act was to halt the movement of industries to-
ward concentration.67 The Supreme Court stated in Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States" that this goal would be achieved only by
''arresting mergers at a time when the trend to a lessening of
competition in a line of commerce was still in its incipiency."69
In United States v. Von's Grocery Co.70 the Court first uti-
lized the theory that a tendency toward concentration was a basis
for finding that a merger would substantially lessen competition.
The case involved the proposed acquisition by a grocery chain of
a competing chain. Although there was not an oligopoly at the
time, the Court noted that the number of single-store grocers in
the Los Angeles area had dropped dramatically in a ten year
period while chain store owners enjoyed a corresponding increase
in the number of stores owned in the same area.7 The Court held
that section 7 was violated when a market is "characterized by a
62. Turner, supra note 27, at 1363.
63. For example, in Clorox the leading producer had 48.8% of the market and the
six largest firms had 80%; in SOS the largest firm had 56% and two firms controlled the
entire domestic market; and in Wilson Sporting Goods the largest manufacturer had 32%,
the top four over 60% and the top nine had 97% of the relevant market. In each case the
merger involved the leading firm in the market.
64. 378 U.S. at 174.
65. Peabody, the nation's leading coal producer, controls only 11.4% of the market.
The top four firms account for 30.5% of the tonnage and the top eleven for only 46.2%.
Over 500 remaining companies accounted for 40.6% of the nation's coal production, ex-
cluding 11.2% captive production. FORTUNE, Sept. 1971, at 100.
66. 467 F.2d at 76.
67. 96 CONG. REc. 16506 (1950) (remarks by Senator O'Conor).
68. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
69. Id. at 317.
70. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
71. Id. at 273.
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long and continuous trend toward fewer and fewer owner-
competitors which is exactly the sort of trend. . . Congress.
declared must be arrested."72
In the Kennecott case, the FTC found that "the growth of the
leading firms compared with the growth of the coal industry is on
the way to becoming highly concentrated."" This finding was
based on the fact that the top four firms in the coal market had
enjoyed a dramatic growth as compared to the coal industry as a
whole.7 The Tenth Circuit affirmed this finding. However, nei-
ther the FTC nor the Tenth Circuit sought to ascertain the true
state of competition within the coal market, choosing instead to
arbitrarily apply the statistical principle of "tending toward con-
centration." They made no effort to analyze the cause for the
tendency and such an analysis would have demonstrated that
competition is still in fact very strong within the coal market.75
There are several indicia that competition has not suffered
with the rapid growth of the leading firms in the coal market.
First, and most important, is the cause for the tendency. The
Tenth Circuit noted that "contracts with electrical utilities are
long term, generally for the life of the utility plant, which fact
serves to stabilize the coal production and to enable it to system-
ize its distribution facilities."" Such long-range contracts neces-
sarily cause a degree of concentration in the market because of
the disparity in production between companies with such large
volume agreements and smaller companies.77 The Tenth Circuit
completely failed to take into account the actual competitive
situation within the market. Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting in
Von's Grocery, feared a result such as that reached by the Tenth
Circuit in the Kennecott case. He argued that the majority in
72. Id. at 278.
73. Kennecott Copper Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,619 at 21,666 (F.T.C. 1970).
74. Sixty-eight firms, producing over a million tons of coal annually, controlled
seventy percent of the market in 1967 whereas they had only forty-eight percent of the
market in 1947. The top four companies went from 15.8 percent in 1954 to 29.2 percent in
1967. During that period the entire coal market expanded by 40.9 percent, while the share
of the top four companies increased by 160.5 percent.
75. FORTUNE, Sept. 1971 at 100-101.
76. 467 F.2d at 73 n.4.
77. For example, a 1300-megawatt generating unit requires about 3.5 and 4.0 million
tons of coal a year, or nearly 100 million tons over its useful life. Only twenty-two com-
panies produce enough coal annually to supply the requirements for such a utility. Neces-
sarily, companies with such contracts will be larger than the majority of the 500 coal




Von's Grocery apparently adopted the fallacy that competition is
necessarily reduced when the number of competitors is reduced."s
This change in the method of marketing coal has been ampli-
fied by the overall change in the coal consumption patterns. Total
coal production declined by over 200 million tons during the fif-
teen year period prior to 1961. From that date until the merger it
increased by 150 million tons. 9 Most of that increase has been
taken up by the electric utility industry "which today represents
the only substantial and growing source of business for the coal
industry."80 Hence the companies with long term contracts with
major utilities necessarily grew more rapidly and in a dispropor-
tionate manner than most coal companies.8 '
The Kennecott court chose to apply the tending toward con-
centration rationale without analysis of the economic realities of
the coal market. Statistical analysis alone is not enough. It is
imperative in such cases that the court look to the market struc-
ture in considering the competitive effects of the merger.
KENNEcOTT As THE MOST LIKELY ENTRANT
A second condition Turner finds necessary to prohibit a
merger under the potential competition rationale is that the
"merging firm at the edge of the market must be recognized...
as the most likely entrant or one of a very few likely entrants." 2
In Kennecott the court found that "no other likely entrants were
shown to exist. 8s3 This factor was based on the FTC's finding
"that oil companies [and] natural gas companies . . .are not
to be regarded as likely entrants." 4 By arbitrarily eliminating oil
and gas companies as likely entrants the court was able to find
Kennecott to be the most likely entrant, thereby making it possi-
78. 384 U.S. at 287 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
79. Initial Decision, Kennecott Copper Corp., No. 8765 at 41 (F.T.C. 1970).
80. "Coal consumption by electric utilities has risen from 86 million tons, or 20
percent of total steam coal consumption, in 1947, to 272 million tons, or 70 percent of total
steam coal consumption, in 1967." Id. at 33.
81. Small coal companies "which served the traditional railroad and retail demands
for fuel and which had inadequate capital to take advantage of the development of new
production techniques and assemble the large reserves required to bid for utility business,
have been unable to grow in the modern condition of the coal industry. Instead, they either
have amalgamated into larger enterprises or have ceased doing business or have confined
themselves to serving the limited local sources of demand." Id. at 58.
82. Turner, supra note 27, at 1363 (emphasis added).
83. 467 F.2d at 77.
84. Id.
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ble to apply the "most likely entrant" criterion. Such a finding
was without basis in fact.
The Hearing Examiner had found that there were several
companies with "specialized incentives and capabilities to enter
including major oil, natural gas companies, and electrical utili-
ties." 5 His findings were borne out by the acquisition of two
major coal companies within a period of two years after the Ken-
necott acquisition.86 The Commission negated the Examiner's
finding, stating that these industries were "primarily interested
in acquiring coal reserves for synthetic fuels and the sale of coal
is a secondary objective.""7 This finding is of questionable eco-
nomic relevance. Five of the ten largest coal companies are owned
by oil companies, and they are all active in the commercial as-
pects of the coal industry.8 Even if these oil companies had not
been presently involved in the sale of coal, their presumed desire
to make a profit would still make them potential competitors.
That they are waiting at the edge of the market to enter will exert
a competitive influence." Entry into the market through an ac-
quisition will not lessen competition because "if an acquiring
company is one of a number of potential entrants that are simi-
larly situated, the likelihood that the merger will remove a sub-
stantial competitive influence is rather small." 0 Although other
potential competition has not often been used in antitrust cases
85. Initial Decision, Kennecott Copper Corp., No. 8765 at 222 (F.T.C. 1970).
86. On August 30, 1968, Standard Oil of Ohio purchased Old Ben Coal Corporation,
the eighth largest company in terms of production, and on October 31, 1969 American
Metal Climax purchased the sixth largest firm, Ayrshire Coal Company. Previously, Occi-
dental Petroleum Corporation had acquired the third largest coal producer, Island Creek
Coal Company.
87. 467 F.2d at 77.
88. Since 1963 oil companies have been acquiring coal companies and vast coal
reserves. They are not, however, acquired solely for internal use. These "oil companies
may soon become customers as well, by producing gas from coal, a process that is still in
the experimental stage." FORTUNE, Sept. 1971, at 100.
89. A recent Supreme Court decision, United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 93
S.Ct. 1096 (1973), indicates that the competitive effect exerted by a company at the edge
of the market is a strong criterion in weighing the effect of an acquisition. The Court
agreed that the Government had failed to prove that Falstaff would have entered the
northeastern beer market other than by acquisition but remanded for a finding as to
whether or not the competitors within the relevant market regarded the defendant as a
potential entrant. If Falstaff were so regarded it is clear that it would exert a competitive
influence even if it would not enter except by merging with an established competitor.
The Court did, however, consider the number of potential entrants. In short, the removal
of a company from the edge of the market when it is demonstrated that the company
exerted some competitive influence is violative of section 7.
90. Turner, supra note 27, at 1377.
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to expand the relevant market so as to reduce the probable effect
of a merger, it must inevitably be considered if the required hold-
ing is that the acquiring corporation is "the most likely entrant."
DISPARITY IN SIZE-THE DEEP POCKET THEORY
One criterion relied on in section 7 product extension cases
has been the disparate size of the acquiring firm in relation to
other firms in the relevant market." The courts feared that this
difference in size would give the merging firms advantages not
enjoyed by smaller competitors and that the resulting rise in
barriers to entry would discourage new competitors from entering
the market. In the Clorox case the Court felt that the size differ-
ence would work to the disadvantage of smaller bleach manufac-
turers because Procter & Gamble could give volume discounts
and realize savings in production and marketing costs. The
Kennecott court recognized the problem presented when a vastly
larger corporation seeks to enter a market comprised of smaller
producers and attempted to apply this rationale to Kennecott's
acquisition of Peabody. The court held that "it was proper for the
Commission to consider the actual effect on competition of the
merger of two very large corporations with their tremendous re-
sources and to place major emphasis on this factor. '9 2 The court
said that the acquisition would raise substantially the already
high barriers to entry into the coal market and referred to this
disparity in size as the "deep pocket" of funds.
The real import of the Kennecott decision is the court's hold-
ing that the FTC is justified in relying on the deep pockets of the
acquiring firm as the primary basis for finding an acquisition
violative of section 7. The FTC had barely mentioned this "deep
pocket of funds and other resources" available to Kennecott-
Peabody in its analysis of the effect of the acquisition. The Tenth
Circuit, however, gave great weight to the FTC's reliance upon
the company's deep pocket of funds. 3 The court suggested that
this deep pocket would enable Kennecott to gain marketing and
production advantages over existing coal manufacturers. The
basis for this supposition was the product extension merger cases
which based their holdings in large part upon the comparative
sizes of the acquiring firms and existing competitors.
91. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); General Foods
Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968).
92. 467 F.2d at 78.
93. Id.
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The Clorox and SOS decisions, both involving product exten-
sion mergers, relied in part on the disparate size of the acquiring
firm as compared to those firms competing in the relevant mar-
ket; this is basically the deep pockets rationale. Those two cases,
however, had very little precedential value for the Kennecott-
Peabody merger. First, those cases relied on the deep pocket
theory only in the context of product extension, where the prod-
ucts of the acquiring and acquired firms are complementary. Sec-
ond, in the product extension cases the acquiring firm was clearly
larger than any competitor in the relevant market.
That the deep pocket theory has to date been applied only
to product extension mergers does not mean that it is without
validity in other conglomerate acqusitions. It appears that the
rationale utilized by the courts in product extensions cases would
be generally applicable and that the "substitution of the powerful
acquiring firm for the smaller, but already dominant, firm may
substantially reduce the competitive structure of the industry by
raising entry barriers and by dissuading smaller firms from ag-
gressively competing."94 Thus there is a potential loss of competi-
tion even where the products of the merging firms are not related.
The trend in recent antitrust cases and the stated hopes of the
Justice Department indicate that the deep pocket rationale will
in fact be extended to all conglomerate mergers without regard
to the relationship between the products of the firms involved.
More cases are speaking in terms of size itself as one criterion for
ordering divestiture, but until the Kennecott decision no court
had held that deep pockets alone would justify a finding of anti-
competitive effect.
There is, however, some question as to the validity of the
deep pocket rationale as applied to the Kennecott-Peabody ac-
quisition. The facts of this particular case do not justify the ex-
tension of that rationale. The FTC seemed reluctant to do so, and
instead tried to describe the Peabody acquisition as a product
extension merger, finding Kennecott to be "peculiarly well quali-
fied because of its long experience in hard rock mining and ...
its close proximity to the coal industry."95 This argument was
completely abandoned by the Tenth Circuit, which relied solely
on the second aspect of the product extension cases-that the
acquiring firm was clearly larger than any competitor in the rele-
vant market. However, Kennecott was entering a market in
94. 386 U.S. at 578.
95. 3 TRADE REG. REP. at 92,839.
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which eight of the twenty largest firms were owned by parent
companies the same size or larger than Kennecott. It would seem
that the introduction of Kennecott's deep pockets would have
been offset by the economic strength of existing competitors in
the coal industry. Moreover, the court seemed to recognize that
barriers to entry into the coal industry were already so high that
the depth of Kennecott's pockets would have no impact on other
potential entrants. The court noted that "even before the instant
merger . . . it was virtually impossible for a company with fewer
resources than Kennecott to start a coal company by the acquisi-
tion of reserves and equipment." 6 In other words, the so called
deep pockets of Kennecott-Peabody was of negligible signifi-
cance; disparity in size did not exist. The court chose to apply
this deep pockets rationale to an acquisition where the facts did
not support the validity of the deep pocket principle as an indica-
tor of a substantial lessening of competition.
The import of the Kennecott decision will be felt in two
areas. Its foremost effect will be in the future application of sec-
tion 7 to conglomerate mergers. There will also be a secondary
impact in the coal industry.
The Kennecott court seems to have chosen an inappropriate
case to extend the deep pocket theory, since the rationale did not
fit the facts of the case. Nevertheless, the extension appears to
be the next step after the product extension cases. This would
indicate that the courts may no longer look to whether the effect
of an acquisition is to "tend to substantially lessen competition,"
but rather, as Attorney General Mitchell stated in 1969, size may
become the controlling factor. The result may be to end future
acquisitions, other than toe-hold acquisitions, 7 by any large cor-
porations without regard to the statutory requirement that com-
petition be reduced.
The Kennecott decision may also have impact in the devel-
opment of the coal industry. Economists agree that there is a
great need to inject capital into the coal industry because "coal
is the only fuel available to fill the gap between the demand for
energy and the supply of natural gas, oil and nuclear power. ''98
The present economic status of the coal industry is not sufficient
to meet the projected national usage of 400 million tons in 1985.
96. 467 F.2d at 77.
97. See note 18 supra.
98. BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 4, 1972, at 50.
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An investment of over $30 billion may be necessary to fulfill the
nation's energy needs. 9
The divestiture of Peabody from Kennecott may not have an
immediate effect on the available capital for expansion of coal
production. The FTC, however, alluded to the possibility that the
Kennecott decision might provide a basis for a reversal of trends
within the coal industry by implying that it might order divesti-
ture of other coal companies by large parent companies. Such
action would clearly cause a drain of much needed capital from
an industry attempting to increase the gasification of coal.
CONCLUSION
Unless reversed by the Supreme Court the Kennecott deci-
sion may have far-reaching implications in the area of corporate
diversificiation. The Tenth Circuit recognized that the coal in-
dustry was already dominated by large corporations. It had al-
ready been found by the Hearing Examiner that "Kennecott's
entry into coal by acquisition [was] of no structural signifi-
cance." However the court ignored this finding. Knowing that
Kennecott's deep pockets would have no economic significance in
such a situation it may be inferred that the court intended that
the holding apply to Kennecott merely because of its size without
reference to the actual effect of the merger on competition. Such
an interpretation would indicate that the courts are ready to
allow the government to successfully oppose mergers involving
the top 200 firms without regard to the actual effect of the merger
on competition.
On the particular facts of the Kennecott-Peabody merger
such a result is arguably contrary to the economic realities of the
situation. The court chose to ignore the fact that the structure of
the coal industry is such that it necessarily leads to a degree of
concentration and that it may be necessary to have several large
firms in the market in order to guarantee fulfillment of contracts
with utility companies. A demand for three to four million tons
will put a great strain on a company with lesser resources. In fact,
most existing companies cannot deliver that quantity in one year
without a substantial boost in available capital to facilitate in-
creased production.
The essential point, however, is that competition would still
99. Id. at 50.
100. Initial Decision, Kennecott Copper Corp., No. 8765 at 219 (F.T.C. 1970).
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exist within the market and that the necessary concentration in
the industry should not be viewed as totally anti-competitive. In
1967 there were 522 operating groups producing over 100,000 tons
annually. As only about five percent of this total could enter large
scale utility contracts, it seems clear that there will always be a
disparity in size between the largest companies and the mass of
small coal producers.
Furthermore, in light of the Kennecott decision it appears
that the FTC will use the deep pockets rationale to strike down
any merger solely on the basis of size. This would allow the Com-
mission to determine the internal structure of any market without
analyzing the peculiarities of that market. Arguably this was
Congress' purpose when it amended section 7 in order to stop the
trend toward an "increase of monopolistic mergers" tending to-
ward the "concentration of business in the hands of a few per-
sons."' 10  As Judge Learned Hand said in United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America,02 "[iut is possible, because of its indirect
social and moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers...
to one in which the great mass of those engaged must accept the
direction of a few.' 0 3
101. 96 CONG. REc. 16503 (1950) (remarks by Senator Kefauver).
102. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
103. Id. at 427.
